Notis 286, 02-10-2012. En omfattade och utförlig recension av boken Mysterious Minds, Irreducible to Brains? med Krippner och Friedman som redaktörer, om ”neurobiologin hos psychics, medier och andra extraordinära personer”. Recensionen finns i J of Scientific Explorations #1/12. /JT+GB
Denna utomordentligt 1omfattande bokrecension av bok av bl a vår hedersmedlem, Stanley Krippner. Även vår härvarande parapsykolog, den alltid aktivt skrivande kollegan (hur hinner han med det?), Adrian Parker, medverkar!
Mysterious Minds, Irreducible to Brains?
Mysterious Minds: The Neurobiology of Psychics, Mediums, and
Other Extraordinary People
edited by Stanley Krippner and Harris L. Friedman. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009. 219 pp. $44.95 (hardcover). ISBN 9780313358661.
This book presents a wide range of anomalous experiences and events and their
possible neural correlates within a framework that is not necessarily materialist-reductionist based. Here psi-related experiences refer to the subjective; whereas psi-related events occur in a scientific setting with objective measures. These
anomalies are presented using a broad spectrum of viewpoints. One end of the
continuum is expressed in Allan Combs’ Foreword, stating that the standards
that psi research is expected to meet are far stricter than most mainstream science
could meet, possibly due to a mindset similar to scientism. The other extreme is
expressed in James Alcock’s chapter (Chapter 2) titled “The Parapsychologist’s
Lament” which portrays in detail the body of difficulties in the field, but ends
with conclusions—e.g., failure to replicate, and that neural correlates of psi
cannot be possible because these things have not been proven to exist.
Chapter 1 by William Roll and Bryan J. Williams addresses the intersection
of quantum theory, neurobiology, and parapsychology. This commences with
a review of the electrophysiology of psi, including psi-related contingent
negative variation and slow cortical potentials, EEG/fMRI correlation studies
of remote stimulation, neural correlates of overt psi performance, fMRI/EEG
of presentiment, and temporal lobe sensitivity in ESP experiences. Quantum
entanglement is used to explain how non-locality may be involved in psi. From
this, theories of mechanism are suggested. Retrocognitive and precognitive
information cross into conscious awareness and psychokinesis is suggested
to involve entropy and negentropy. Next, poltergeists are described as a form
of macro PK (recurrent spontaneous psychokinesis) which takes place when
a witness is not directly observing the object moving. This is justified by the
quantum Zeno effect. Micro PK, or changes in RNG to a non-random output, is
presented here as being correlated with alpha brain activity. Quantum physics
may very well be the key to explaining how psi occurs, but, at this point,
mapping psi onto quantum entanglement and other quantum effects is merely
an analogy and not a direct mechanism of action of psi.
Chapter 2 contains Alcock’s negative appraisal of the field, as previously
mentioned. He claims that there is a lack of replicability in psi studies.
Ironically, the very next chapter by Caroline Watt and Harvey Irwin provides
ample evidence that this is not the case, with an emphasis on “independent
replications” in their review. Next, Alcock claims that “ad hoc constructs” like
an experimenter effect are unfalsifiable. To me, this claim is reminiscent of
Freudian ego-defense mechanisms. It may be that Alcock’s own bias against
evidence of psi is unfalsifiable to himself. Following this, Alcock makes the
bold claim that without a theory of the mechanism of action involved in psi
and robust evidence that psi exists, we cannot link deviations in objective
measures to specific hypotheses. It is not clear that this is the case. Objective
observations and correlations, even without a specific mechanism of action,
are valid. Hypothesis building may indeed lead to further research which may
elucidate the mechanisms of action involved in psi. Alcock ends his chapter
with, “there can be no ‘neurobiology of ESP and PK’ until first one can be sure
that there is ESP and PK” (p. 42). This appears to be in contradiction with even
the most extreme of viewpoints against psi, that psi is merely an internally
generated hallucination of the brain. Even in that case, there should be neural
correlates of such human experience worthy of study. The chapter ends with
“. . . what it would take for parapsychologists, if there is no psi, to accept that
conclusion” (p. 41). This assumes that all parapsychologists are biased in the
opposite direction of diehard skeptics. It is unclear that any body of evidence for
psi would ever meet Alcock’s criteria for existence. He is clearly indoctrinated
in scientism. As my friend Julia Mossbridge once said to a skeptical colleague,
“I’m sorry; I did not realize you were religious about science. I thought you
were an empiricist and valued evidence.”
Chapter 3 is a review by Watt and Irwin of the laboratory evidence for psi.
This is broken down into two types of research, proof-oriented and processoriented
studies of ESP. Next, definitions based on Rhine (1934) are given for
precognition, telepathy, and clairvoyance. Meta-analysis of a pool of studies is
presented as a useful tool to show how many null studies would be needed to
counteract studies with positive results and thus support the null hypothesis of no
psi. This is helpful to demonstrate that anomalous results significantly different
from chance are indeed consistent across studies. Of course, considering the
conflicting results between various meta-analysis publications, this is making
the assumption that all meta-analyses show a significant deviation from chance
or significantly large effect sizes. Such discrepancies suggest that the biases
of the people conducting a meta-analysis can affect the outcome and results.
Interestingly, despite the tendency of the use of meta-analysis to shoot down the
file drawer effect, Watt and Irwin state that “. . . proof-oriented ESP experiments have not succeeded in establishing the reality of ESP” (p. 48). As in the Alcock chapter, the reason given for this statement is lack of a specific mechanism of psi action. Surely in the early days of scientific discovery, correlations and subsequent theory building were essential to unraveling the mysteries of mechanisms of action. Particularly relevant to this topic is the fact that most modern-day neuroimaging is merely correlational by design, which does not necessarily reveal causation. Without true causation, where is the mechanism of action?
Next, there is an overview of independently replicable patterns seen in
psi performance such as the sheep–goat effect (psi-missing correlating with
negative attitudes toward psi, psi-hitting correlated with positive attitudes
toward psi), position effects (clustering of hits at the beginnings or ends of runs
and displacement forward or backward by trials, both of which are associated
with negative attitudes), and decline effects. This is followed by a review of
electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies, some with selected and some
with unselected subjects, suggesting that reduced physiological arousal is psiconducive.
Chapter 4 by Adrian Parker considers psychokinesis (PK) within a dualist
and other perspectives. One other perspective is panpsychism. This is defined
here as “. . . the unique property of neural matter to provide the means for
producing consciousness. . . ” (p. 67). Next, evidence of PK is presented. Much
of this is from subjective experiences of objects moving on their own, or macro-
PK. Some has come from laboratories such as PEAR (Princeton Engineering
Anomalies Research Laboratory) using random number generators (RNG) to
study “micro-PK.” The positive results seen at PEAR have not been replicated
with significant results or similar effect size according to Parker. Additionally,
other studies have shown psi-missing attributed to micro-PK within micro-
PK protocols. Such varying results might be caused by mixing gifted PK
subjects with the average person who does not have such ability. That would
explain why such a small effect is seen. Interestingly, based on a meta-analysis
by Radin and Ferrari (1991) of dice-throwing studies, there is a very small
but significant and consistent effect of PK with intention. This appears to be
universal and is not present in control studies. This suggests that this small but
universal effect is not due to an error. Subsequently, Parker describes a PKconducive psychological state involving “. . . suspension of one’s critical ability and dissociation from one’s ordinary sense of identity” (p. 75). This is followed by cases of poltergeists involving disturbed adolescents with apparent temporal lobe abnormalities. The conclusion of the chapter includes an introduction of the filter theory, attributed to F. W. H. Myers, about how much information
processing takes place outside of conscious awareness.
Chapter 5, by Joan Hageman and colleagues, is titled “The Neurobiology
of Trance and Mediumship in Brazil.” The chapter commences with a detailed
list of “methodological pitfalls” in such studies. These include materialist
interpretations (assuming region-specific brain activity as the origin and cause
of such experiences), secondhand hearsay, causality/directionality within a
proposed mind–brain interaction, superficially clustering subjects by their
subjective experience, ignoring the holistic viewpoint, theories that do not
include a mechanism of action or are not all-encompassing of phenomena, and
finally using novices instead of expert subjects. This is followed by an overview
of electrophysiology/neuroimaging studies of various trance and religious
experiences including a table for comparison. Common findings include an
increase in brain activity in the frontal lobes during trance. Next, they present
two original studies conducted in Brazil with mediums. In the first study, two
mediums and a control were used. To avoid motion-induced artifacts in the
autonomic (hand temperature, EMG, heart rate, and skin conductance level) and
central (EEG) measures, “. . . mediums were instructed to imagine incorporating
a spirit (rather than to engage in direct incorporation)” (p. 97). This fact alone
means that the results obtained do not necessarily reflect what occurs in the
physiology of a medium when he/she actually does the regular process. Results
from the two mediums were paradoxical, combining sympathetic activation
in the ANS with relaxation in the CNS. Study two employed EEG (with no
mention of montage or number of channels) with nine mediums, all free of
known mental illness and use of indigenous ritualistic substances, doing their
usual practices of mediumship. EEG findings did not show a consistent pattern among the mediums, but ranged from absolutely normal electrical activity to some degree of EEG slowing. (p. 104) This was determined by comparing the baseline with the trance states. Most noteworthy, none of these mediums showed any evidence of epilepsy. This chapter mainly shows that more and better research is needed in this area to
elucidate neural correlates of trance and mediumistic experiences.
Chapter 6 by Norman Don is a presentation of his group’s research which
includes unconscious physiological measures associated with psi. In a number
of the studies presented, behavioral performance on psi tasks was at chance
level, but physiological responses to targets were different than responses to
non-targets, providing evidence of unconscious physiological differences
associated with precognition and clairvoyance, depending on the design.
Following this, Don presents his EEG research with a professed psychic, Olof
Jonsson. Jonsson claimed that he experienced three unique states (CD 1–3)
which he associated with psi, CD 2 and CD 3 being the prime states for this.
In the analysis, CD 3 was contrasted with CD 1. CD 3 with psi-hitting was
associated with right hemispheric dominance shown by EEG power and 40 Hz
occipital activity. Using Stepwise discriminant analysis, a model was developed
that allowed for correct classification of CD 1 and CD 3 and classification of
correct versus incorrect behavioral psi responses with the incredible claim
of ≥90% accuracy. Based on this 40 Hz gamma activity, Don and colleagues
decided to go back to reexamine the data in their ERP studies of unconscious
psi. As expected, they found that there was “. . . significantly more 40 Hz EEG
activity for target card imagery than for non-target imagery” (p. 118). This was
demonstrated in the right frontal and posterior regions. Don and colleagues
have also seen similar gamma activity in ayahuasca users during Brazilian
rituals, trance surgeons during a “possession trance,” and even those claiming
to have been abducted by extraterrestrials during self-initiated altered states
of consciousness involving hyper-vigilance. This was often with simultaneous
random event generators giving non-random output. Additionally, Don was
inspired to examine the hits and misses in behavioral data. He created a table
of this which resulted in what appeared to be a wave-like oscillating pattern.
This was visible even though the behavioral results were at chance, suggesting
the answers were random. However, despite there being no periodicity in the
data, spectral analysis revealed peaks that were significant. Don termed these
anomalies “correlation waves.” In further research, the peaks in these wave
patterns tended to correspond to hits. Don interpreted this to represent a leak
from the unconscious mind to consciousness based on placement of the trial
within the run. Furthermore, Don claimed this was found in both precognition
and clairvoyance experiments. Based on this, Don made a statement that this
“. . . suggests that psi is woven into the very fabric of nature” (p. 125). On further
speculation, Don ties this together with the gamma waves and correlation waves.
While the information provided in this chapter is intriguing, there are many
questions which remain unanswered to this reader. For instance, it is not clear
from this chapter if the differences seen between target and non-target averages
are statistically significant. Furthermore, the explanation of “correlation waves”
is unclear. Finally, connecting gamma brain waves and correlation waves with
psi and the fabric of the universe seems a bit premature. Presumably, many of
these issues would become clearer upon reading the original papers. However,
a chapter such as this should be complete within itself.
Chapter 7 by Vernon Neppe is an attempt to present the neurobiology
of “subjective paranormal experiences” (SPEs). Oddly enough, none of the
published research by Varela and colleagues about neurophenomenology
is included in the chapter. Out of body experiences (OBEs) and near-death
experiences (NDEs) are discussed in relation to the supposed induction of
similar experiences via brain stimulation, and in relation to traumatic insults
and pathologies such as narcolepsy and temporal lobe sensitivities. Some of
this appears to suggest that “REM intrusion” into normal consciousness may
be associated with SPEs. Next, Neppe transitions awkwardly into a review of
fMRI studies of ESP, commencing with an appropriately scathing review of
Moulton and Kosslyn (2008) and their Harvard press release. Ironically, as
Neppe reports, one pair of the subjects in this study appeared to show above
chance on ESP scores, and trials of correct ESP responses were associated with
unique brain activity changes (reductions in brain activity in temporal lobes and
other areas). Moulton and Kosslyn dismissed this as artifact. In contrast to his
previous assertions, Neppe proceeds to say that subtle differences associated
with psi may not be easily seen in fMRI due to the low signal-to-noise ratio.
There is substantial evidence against Neppe’s claim that subtle differences may
not be seen in fMRI. Many event-related fMRI experiments have discerned
parametric subtleties in responses and successfully deconvolved overlapping
hemodynamic response curves even to very brief stimuli (for instance, refer to
Dale and Buckner 1997). Next, Neppe proceeds with a brief survey of previous
and generally more successful fMRI studies of ESP-related anomalies. Then
there is a review of the temporal lobe’s potential involvement in SPEs via the
use of the “Neppe Temporal Lobe Questionnaire” (NTLQ) and the “Inventory
of Neppe of Symptoms of Epilepsy and the Temporal Lobe” (INSET) for
possible temporal lobe symptoms (PTLS). Following this, Neppe provides a
possible neuropsychological basis for SPEs involving frontal lobe inhibition or
inhibition of the “cortical filters.” Obviously, research needs to be conducted
to validate this theory. The chapter ends with Neppe’s own phenomenological
classification of SPEs. Throughout this chapter, Neppe references his own prior
work without clear explanations of meaning and definitions, using his own often
idiosyncratic language. Such a chapter should be complete within itself and not
require one to read all of Neppe’s work to make sense of it. Terms of this ilk
include “dimensional biophysicist” (apparently replacing parapsychologist),
parafamiliar, metafamiliar, queryfamiliar, and Neppe’s Anomalous Multiaxial
Event System (NAMES).
Chapter 8 by Morris Freedman is simply titled “Psi and the Brain.”
Freedman points out that despite the large body of literature on psi, there has
been a lack of focus on the potential neural correlates or specific brain loci
correlated with authentic psi. Here authentic psi is differentiated from Neppe’s
SPEs and limited to lab experiments with objective measures including REG
and neuroimaging. Freedman elaborates that there are many brain regions that
have been theorized to be involved with objective psi, e.g., reticular formation
of the brain stem and right hemispheric occipito–parietal regions, in contrast
with SPEs which appear to involve the temporal lobes. One theory given about
the reason for the elusiveness of psi is that we have developed, evolutionarily, a
filter to inhibit the overwhelming surge of psi-related input we receive at every
moment. Without such a filter, we would be overwhelmed and unable to focus
on information vital for our survival. If we could discover the nature of such a
filter, and find a way to inhibit it, this might uncover the neural correlates that
mediate authentic psi and improve access to strong psi phenomena. As in the
previous chapter, there is mention of reducing self-awareness and frontal lobe
activity, perhaps via altered states of consciousness that may be intertwined
with this filter. Freedman further explains that neuropsychological patients with
frontal lobe lesions or disorders with known deficits in frontal lobe functioning
could be key to examining this theory. He then presents a pilot study using
patients with pre-existing frontal lesions. A random event generator (REG)
was used with a visual stimuli representing the outputs. Only one patient, one
with a left frontal lesion, was able to significantly alter the REG output, and
thus the visual display, toward the right hemifield with directed intention. One
possible explanation given is that an intact right frontal lobe is required to
sustain attention to complete the task at hand. Thus, right frontal lesion and
bilateral lesion patients were unable to accomplish this. Freedman rightfully
suggests that further research is needed to verify the importance of left frontal
lobe inhibition in psi tasks. Note that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
might be used to create reversible functional lesions in human subjects, e.g., to
test this theory.
Chapter 9, by David Luke and Harris Friedman, focuses on the
neurochemistry of psi and SPEs. Psychedelic psychotherapy using LSD has
yielded much evidence of psi-related SPEs. Furthermore, self-reports of
psychedelic users has also yielded a high percent of such experiences using
the Anomalous Experiences Inventory. It is not clear if this is showing a cause
and effect relationship between the use of psychedelics and such experiences. It
may be that people who choose to use psychedelics do so because they believe
in SPEs and are trying to induce them. Therefore, belief and corresponding
interpretation of experience may have more to do with SPEs in these people
than do the psychedelics themselves. Alternatively, these substances may
be inhibiting frontal lobe activity and self-awareness of the body, leading to
dissociation and inhibition of a possible psi filter. The authors review seventeen
studies involving the use of psychedelics in the lab with psi tasks using a
forced-choice paradigm. The majority of these were exploratory and lacking
methodological rigor such as a control condition, etc., and they did not yield
significant results. Only one such study (van Asperen de Boer, Barkema, &
Kappers 1966) demonstrated that psilocybin produced psi-hitting significantly
greater than chance using a Zener-card–like task. Free-response experiments
have yielded much better results than forced-choice protocols. As expected,
Luke and Friedman report that subjects in these studies were “high” and thus
it was difficult to get them to focus on a laboratory experiment. Osis (1961)
and Wezelman and Bierman (1997) are examples of studies also showing
significant results. Again, as in previous chapters, a model of the brain as a
filter to psi is suggested. Psychedelics, as Huxley (1954) put it, may “. .
override the ‘reducing valve’ of the brain” (p. 167) and thus permit psi to
emerge into conscious awareness. Subsequently, Luke and Friedman present
several neurochemical models of psi and SPEs based on psychedelics and their
central mechanisms of action. This includes a disruption (via antagonism of
5-HT2A receptors) of the cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuit, the β-carboline
and tryptamine model via MAO inhibition as via DMT (dimethyltryptamine)
and ayahuasca, or endogenously via pineal secretions, the DMT model again
with endogenous involvement of the pineal, and a ketamine model of NMDAreceptor
binding, blocking glutamate and eliciting dissociative experiences. As
the authors readily admit, this chapter is highly speculative. The conclusion
of the chapter is that there are four possible models of psi and SPEs: (1) the
brain acting as a filter, (2) the β-carboline and tryptamine model, and the
(3) DMT and (4) ketamine models. However, one possibility, as mentioned
by the authors, is that all of these models interact, intersect, or even overlap.
Psychedelics and ketamine may work via different mechanisms to inhibit the
frontal lobe function where such a psi-filter may exist.
The book ends with a Postscript by Stanley Krippner and Harris Friedman,
emphasizing a “costly signaling theory” (CST). In accordance with CST, such
a signal between people (perhaps telepathy) would need to be “. . . reliable,
authentic, and fairly impervious to fakery” (p. 191). However, this is not
how psi appears to work. Furthermore, the explanation of this theory in the
context of psi is not very clear here. Following this is an overview of the book’s
various chapters, and excessive references to Gazzaniga. Mirror neurons are
presented as binding people. Could this be a neural interface of telepathy via
some non-local or quantum entanglement-like mechanism? At this point, that
is mere conjecture. The Postscript ends with a non-materialist explanation of
consciousness in which a mind may exist outside of the brain.
In sum, this book provides a wealth of information and varying opinions
of relevant studies of SPEs and psi; some contesting the existence of psi,
whereas others provide evidence in favor of it. The studies presented are a
bit selective and uneven in quality. This is all within the context of possible
neural correlates of psi and related SPEs. Suggested neural correlates for psi
and related SPEs include slow cortical potentials, gamma waves (40 Hz),
and temporal lobe abnormalities as shown in EEG; fMRI correlates; reduced
physiological arousal, as measured by psychophysiology and neuroimaging,
shown to be conducive to psi; the model of the cortex (possibly the frontal
lobes) acting as a filter for unconscious psi; and psychedelic models of psi
including serotonergic and glutamatergic systems possibly inhibiting the
frontal lobes and thus the filter of psi. Several chapters mention the need for
theories of mechanism of action of psi and related experiences while ignoring
the evidence for psi. Other chapters supply metaphors of quantum mechanics
without a direct mapping onto phenomena. In order to progress in this field,
testable hypotheses of mechanisms of action are needed. Some theories may
help divulge a mechanism of action of psi, whereas others may not. If theories
are not supported by evidence, this does not discount the possibility of psi.
However, it remains clear that until a mechanism/or mechanisms of action for
psi can be supported by objective evidence, leading to predictions of outcome
and replicability, this debate will be ongoing.
EDWARD JUSTIN MODESTINO
Ray Westphal Neuroimaging Laboratory
Division of Perceptual Studies
Department of Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sciences
University of Virginia Health System
ejm9f@virginia.edu
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